Abstract: This article examines the impact of a conditional cash transfer programme in Nicaragua on
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, increasing emphasis has been placed on the importance of human capital in stimulating economic growth and social development. There is also growing recognition of the need for social safety nets to protect households from poverty and its consequences during the push for economic growth (de Janvry et al., 2006; World Bank, 1997) . Consistent with this, several Latin American countries have introduced conditional cash transfer programmes that integrate investing in human capital with access to a social safety net (Handa and Davis, 2006; Rawlings and Rubio, 2005) . One of the first, and largest, programmes was the Programa Nacional de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (PROGRESA, now called Oportunidades) in Mexico, begun in 1997. Another large programme is Bolsa Alimentação, a nutritionoriented cash transfer programme in Brazil. A third such programme, examined in this article, is the
Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social (RPS).
The broad objective of these programmes is to generate a sustained decrease in poverty in some of the most disadvantaged regions in their respective countries. Their entry point for doing so is human capital, starting with the premise that a significant cause of the intergenerational transmission of poverty is the inability of poor households to invest in the human capital of their children. These programmes attack this problem by targeting transfers to poor households and conditioning them on actions intended to improve children's human capital development. This effectively transforms cash transfers into human capital subsidies.
Substantial research has demonstrated the effectiveness of such programmes for a range of outcomes related to current consumption and human capital investments (Rawlings and Rubio, 2005; Skoufias, 2005) . Much less, however, is known about other, indirect, programme effects that also may contribute to their overall objective of poverty reduction, such as increased economically productive investment, particularly in agriculture and livestock, the main income-generating sources in the rural areas targeted by these programmes (Gertler et al., 2006; Todd et al., 2007; Davis and Stampini, 2002) .
By providing transfers, these programmes alleviate liquidity and, possibly, credit constraints that are typically thought to inhibit investment in developing countries (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993) .
Moreover, to the extent that transfers are considered permanent or reliable flows, risk-averse households that receive them may be more willing to undertake risky investments (Gertler et al., 2007) .
Given the short-term nature of transfers (for only three years), for RPS the liquidity and credit constraint channels are likely to be the most important. Given their size, the mere transfer of cash under RPS, even with conditionality, almost certainly relaxes liquidity constraints. Moreover, Nielson and Olinto (2006) find some evidence that RPS relaxed credit constraints for beneficiary households. Sadoulet et al. (2001) , in the context of the Mexican programme PROCAMPO, which includes transfers, demonstrate that the indirect effects of transfers loosening such constraints may include purchase of productive inputs (leading to short-run gains) as well as productive assets leading to longer-run gains.
When households are liquidity constrained, assets may be underemployed or inefficiently allocated. In this article, I explore whether RPS has stimulated productive investment, examining some of these indirect mechanisms through which the programme might have contributed to a reduction in poverty.
More specifically, I first present quantitative impacts of RPS on consumption, measured by household expenditures, as well as on a wide range of outcomes related to productive investments. This is done using a randomised evaluation in which the same households were interviewed both before and after the programme began, in both intervention and control areas. While only limited information was collected on productive activities, the strength of the evaluation design permits a rigorous assessment of many possible productive investment behaviours. Second, as an alternative approach to exploring whether productive investments are being made, I estimate a consumption equation which provides the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) out of transfers, as well as the effect of cumulative past transfers, which may have been invested, on consumption (Gertler et al., 2007) . While there is ample evidence that the programme increased consumption, the evidence that it increased investment is weak, and limited to small increases in agricultural equipment. Moreover, the assessment of the MPC out of transfers shows that nearly 100 per cent of the transfers are spent, and cumulative past transfers have no effect on current consumption. To some extent, the results are unsurprising, given the programme objectives of increasing food expenditures and improving child human capital. In contrast to the gains made in human capital development of children (reported elsewhere), the potential for long term increases in consumption as a result of increased investment due to RPS appear to be limited.
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RED DE PROTECCIÓN SOCIAL
Modelled after PROGRESA, RPS was designed to address both current and future poverty through cash transfers targeted to poor households in rural Nicaragua. The transfers were conditional, and households monitored to ensure that, among other things, their children were attending school and making visits to preventive healthcare providers and a household representative attended a series of health education workshops. When households failed to fulfil those obligations, they lost their eligibility. RPS's specific stated objectives included:
• supplementing household income for up to three years to increase expenditures on food,
• reducing dropout rates during the first four years of primary school, and
• increasing the healthcare and nutritional status of children under age five.
There were no formal, or informal, conditions related to productive investments other than (child) human capital. RPS comprised two phases over six years, starting in 2000. Phase I (the pilot phase) lasted three years with a budget of $11 million, representing approximately 0.2 per cent of GDP (World Bank, 2001 ).
In late 2002, based in part on the positive findings of the various evaluations, the Government of Nicaragua (GON) and Inter-American Development Bank agreed to a continuation and expansion of the programme, referred to as Phase II, for four more years with a budget of $22 million. In Phase II, original beneficiaries were phased out of the programme and new beneficiaries were incorporated.
Programme targeting
For Phase I of RPS, the GON first targeted rural areas in two departments (Madriz and Matagalpa) from the Central Region, on the basis of poverty as well as on their capacity to implement the programme. The focus on rural areas reflected the distribution of poverty in Nicaragua-of the 48 per cent of Nicaraguans designated as poor in 1998, 75 per cent resided in rural areas (World Bank, 2001 ). In 1998, approximately 80 per cent of the rural population of Madriz and Matagalpa were poor, and half of those were extremely poor. In addition, these departments had easy physical access and communication, relatively strong institutional capacity and local coordination, and good coverage of health posts and schools.
In the next stage of geographic targeting, six (out of 20) municipalities were chosen based on criteria similar to those used at the department level. The six were well targeted in terms of poverty.
Between 36 and 61 per cent of the rural population in each of the chosen municipalities were extremely poor and 78-90 per cent were poor or extremely poor (Maluccio, 2005) , compared with 21 and 45 per cent for Nicaragua as a whole (World Bank, 2003) . While not the poorest municipalities in the country, or in the chosen departments for that matter, the proportion of impoverished people living in these areas was still well above the national average.
In the last stage of geographic targeting, a marginality index was constructed for all 59 rural census comarcas 1 (hereafter localities) in the selected municipalities. The index was the weighted average of a set of locality-level indicators (including family size, access to potable water, access to latrines, and illiteracy rates) in which higher index scores were associated with more impoverished areas. The 42 localities with the highest scores were selected as eligible and form the evaluation area examined in this article. Although the initial programme design only called for geographic targeting in these 42 localities (that is, with all resident households eligible), about 6 per cent of households, deemed to have substantial resources, were excluded ex ante from the programme (Maluccio, 2005) .
Programme design
RPS had two core components:
Food security, health, and nutrition. Each eligible household received a bimonthly (every two months) cash transfer known as the 'food security transfer,' contingent upon attendance at bimonthly health educational workshops and on bringing their children under age five for scheduled preventive healthcare appointments with specially contracted providers. Children under age two were seen monthly and those between two and five, bimonthly. The workshops were held within the communities and covered household sanitation and hygiene, nutrition, and other related topics.
Education: Each eligible household also received a bimonthly cash transfer known as the 'school attendance transfer,' contingent on enrolment and regular school attendance of children ages 7-13 who had not completed fourth grade of primary school. Additionally, for each eligible child, the household received an annual cash transfer at the start of the school year, intended for school supplies (including uniforms and shoes) known as the 'school supplies transfer,' which was contingent on enrolment. Unlike the school attendance transfer, which was a fixed amount per household regardless of the number of children in school, the school supplies transfer was per child.
At the outset, nearly all households were eligible for the food security transfer, which was a fixed amount per household, regardless of household size. Households with children ages 7-13 who had not yet completed the fourth grade of primary school were also eligible for the education component of the programme. The initial US dollar annual amounts and their Nicaraguan Córdoba equivalents (using the September 2000 average exchange rate of C$ 12.85 to US$ 1.00) were as follows: the food security transfer was $224 a year and the school attendance transfer $112. On its own, the food security transfer represented about 13 per cent of total annual household expenditures in beneficiary households before the programme. A household with one child benefiting from the education component would have received (Caldés et al., 2006) . In contrast to PROGRESA, which indexes transfers to inflation, the nominal value of the transfers remained constant for RPS, with the consequence that the real value of the transfers declined by about 8 per cent due to inflation over two years in Phase I. In Phase II, which began in 2003 and incorporated new beneficiaries, demand-side transfers were reduced. The food security transfer started at $168 for the first year of programme participation and then declined to $145 and $126 in the second and third years. The school attendance transfer also declined, to $90 per year. Partly offsetting these reductions was an increase in the school supplies transfer, which rose from $21 to $25 per student. These figures represent potential transfers.
To enforce compliance with programme requirements, beneficiaries did not receive the food or education component(s) of the transfer when they failed to carry out any of the relevant conditions described above. Annually, approximately 10 per cent of beneficiaries were penalised at least once and therefore did not receive the food, education, or combined transfers. Only the designated household representative was allowed to collect the transfers and, where possible, RPS appointed the mother to this role. As a result, more than 95 per cent were women.
Principal findings from earlier quantitative assessments of Phase I of RPS
Overall, RPS had positive and significant double-difference estimated average effects on a broad range of indicators and outcomes from 2000 to 2002 (during Phase I), including expenditures, healthcare inputs, nutritional status of children under age five, and school enrolment. Where it did not, it was often due to similar, though smaller, improvements in the control areas. Nearly all estimated effects were larger for the extremely poor, reflecting their lower starting points (for example, lower percentages of children enrolled in primary school before the programme). As a result, the programme reduced inequality across expenditure classes for these outcomes (Maluccio and Flores, 2005) .
DESIGN OF THE EVALUATION AND ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY

Evaluation design
The evaluation for Phase I of RPS was based on a randomised, community-based intervention. One-half of the 42 eligible localities were randomly selected into the programme; thus, there are 21 localities in the 'original' intervention group (starting in late 2000) and 21 distinct localities in the 'original' control group. The selection was carried out after ordering the localities by the marginality index into seven strata of six localities each, and randomly selecting from each stratum three localities as intervention and three as control.
In mid-2003 (during Phase II), original control localities were incorporated into the programme.
Initially, RPS was designed to provide transfers and related services for a period of up to three years.
During implementation, however, it was decided to extend the supply-side health and education (which included a small transfer to the schools) components for an additional two years, but not the demand-side transfers. As a result, in 2003, as the original control localities were beginning to receive the programme, the demand-side transfers were terminated in the original intervention localities, though households in those areas continued to be eligible to receive the supply-side health and education components through the end of the period examined in this article. I discuss the implications of the 'cross-over' design for the analysis in Section 3.4.
When randomised evaluations are done well, recipients and nonrecipients will have, on average, the same observed and, more important (since they are more difficult to control for), unobserved characteristics. As a result, they establish a credible basis for comparison, freed from selectivity concerns, and the direction of causality is certain. Even a well-implemented randomised design, however, is not without potential weaknesses. Heckman and Smith (1995) highlight that the apparent simplicity can be deceiving, particularly in poorly designed evaluations where there is contamination due to (1) randomisation bias (where the process of randomisation itself leads to a different beneficiary pool than would otherwise have been treated); (2) anticipation effects where control group behaviour changes as the result of changes in expectations; or (3) substitution bias where nonbeneficiaries obtain similar interventions or services from different sources. There is little reason to believe that randomisation bias is a concern in the RPS evaluation. For example, Adato and Roopnaraine (2004) found no evidence that households moved in part or in whole to obtain the programme. As for anticipatory changes in behaviour in the control group, since the programme was targeted to nearly all households in the localities, it is difficult to determine theoretically what such effects might have been. To the extent that households in original control localities incorporated the probability of receiving the transfers in the future into their decision making, however, the most likely is that, if anything, they would have increased expenditures before the programme began, making the results reported below conservative. I address the possibility of contamination of the control group by other programmes in Section 3.3.
Another limitation with randomised evaluations, or nearly any other evaluation for that matter, is that the results pertain specifically to the study population-extrapolating them to other populations requires additional assumptions that may not be easy to verify (Burtless, 1995) . This is typically referred to as the external validity problem. In the case of RPS, the purposive selection of the programme area may have affected programme performance; therefore the extent to which the results can be generalised is less certain. As described earlier, the selection of municipalities was conditioned on the likelihood of success, so that the observed outcomes might exaggerate the likely outcomes from programme expansion to other areas with, for example, weaker institutional capacity to implement the programme. On the other hand, the observed outcomes may understate the likely outcomes if there was less need for RPS in the targeted areas possibly even because of greater institutional capacity.
While it is not possible to claim that the 42 selected localities are representative of rural Nicaragua, there is evidence that they are similar to a large number of other rural areas in the Central
Region and in the country more broadly. First, three-quarters of the approximately 150 rural localities in the departments of Madriz and Matagalpa have marginality index scores in the same range as the programme areas, as do three-quarters of the approximately 1000 rural localities in the country as a whole. If instead one considers levels of extreme poverty, there are more than 350 localities in the country with extreme poverty at or above 42 per cent, the average level in the targeted areas (Maluccio, 2005) . On these broad indicators used for geographical targeting, then, there are a large number of similar localities, suggesting those chosen were not grossly atypical.
Data collection
The data collected for the evaluation were a household panel data survey implemented in both (Alderman et al., 2001; Thomas et al., 2001 ).
The principal reasons for failure to interview targeted sample households were that household members were temporarily absent (that is, more than the several days the survey team were in the area) or that the dwelling appeared to be uninhabited-both of which are likely to be associated with temporary or permanent migration. Since the advantages of randomisation are dissipated with nonrandom attrition, I
examine the correlates of the observed attrition to assess the likely possible effects or biases on the ensuing analyses (Thomas et al., 2003) . Due to the RPS household census in the localities, which collected a variety of information relevant to the programme, there is information on those households not interviewed in the baseline or follow-up surveys. Probit regressions (not shown) on all original target sample households and predicting the probability of having been interviewed in at least the first round or, separately, having been interviewed in all four rounds, indicate that attrition is indeed nonrandom.
Households that were not interviewed were more likely to have an older, more educated household head, larger family size, higher predicted expenditures, or more land. Moreover, the coefficient on an indicator of whether the household was in an original intervention or control locality is both small and insignificant. I interpret this evidence to mean that attrition in the sample was not systematically related to the intervention. I reconsider the potential for attrition bias in the analysis in Section 3.4.
Validity of the experiment and the evaluation a. Outcome of the randomisation
While the selection of localities into intervention and control groups was undeniably random, it was at the same time only one of the millions of possible random draws from a finite (42) number of localities. As a result, original intervention and control localities may still differ in statistically significant or, more importantly, substantive ways due to an 'unlucky' random draw. In this subsection, I provide evidence that the two groups are indeed quite similar, examining differences between the groups for a set of indicators pertinent to the analysis (Behrman and Todd, 1999) . Perfect 'equality' between the two groups is not necessary for the analysis, since for most outcomes considered it is possible to estimate doubledifferences which control for pre-existing differences. Similarity, however, does put the analysis on a sounder footing, particularly if there is the possibility of heterogeneous programme effects associated with initial differences between the groups and for those effects estimated using single-difference techniques (see Section 3.4).
In Table 1 , I first compare households in original intervention and control localities on a set of demographic, education, wealth, and other indicators. Of 17 indicators compared in the top panel, only one, the number of children less than five years old, is significantly different at a conservative 10 per cent level of significance. This is unlikely to be problematic for the analyses, however, since while they are significantly different they do not appear to be substantively different, differing by less than 0.1 children.
Further, comparisons of the same set of 17 indicators across original intervention and control localities within each poverty group (extreme poor, poor but not extremely poor, and nonpoor) reveal only five significant differences in 51 comparisons. In all these comparisons, then, the percentage of indicators that are statistically significant across groups is approximately as would be expected by random chance.
[
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In the bottom portion of the table, household expenditures and the proportion of households classified as extremely poor, poor but not extremely poor, and nonpoor are compared. 4 While total annual household expenditures are not statistically different across the groups, annual per capita household expenditures are about 5 per cent higher in original intervention localities, largely explained by the small differences in household size seen in the first row. It is expected that the different poverty groups should be about equally represented in original intervention and control localities, in particular because of the stratification into groups of six localities each according to the marginality index for randomisation.
However, reflecting the difference in per capita expenditures, the extreme poverty rate in original control localities is more than 7 percentage points lower than in original intervention localities, and significantly different. Differences between overall poverty rates are half that, but no longer significantly different. As in the case of children under five, however, the magnitude of these differences does not appear to be such that they should greatly affect the results.
b. Potential contamination of the original control localities: Other programmes
Contamination due to substitution bias occurs when households in control localities participate in programmes similar or complementary to RPS. The delay of an additional year (beyond that originally planned) before including the original control localities may have increased the probability of such contamination, as it gave NGOs and others more time to adjust to the presence of RPS in original intervention localities, possibly by pulling their programmes out of those localities and increasing their efforts in control localities. While the RPS evaluation was sanctioned by the GON and, therefore, plans were coordinated such that other large government programmes with similar objectives avoided entering these localities over this period, other actors less tied to the government were not prohibited from doing so. To the extent other programmes are not simply reacting to the evaluation itself, this design offers a more realistic counterfactual compared to one in which no other programme were allowed to enter the localities (what might be referred to as a 'sterile' control group)-in Nicaragua, as in many developing countries, there are a multitude of overlaying programmes and policies with related objectives. If other programmes do react to the intervention, while the pure RPS programme impact is more difficult to assess, it is also reasonable to characterise the changes in other programmes as being a result of RPS and therefore the net effects as those reflecting the effectiveness of the programme in a real world context.
Potential contamination due to other development programmes providing services to households was monitored in the annual household surveys. These data allow one to calculate the percentage of households in each locality that were benefiting from an array of possible programmes and services, and to determine whether or not RPS was the provider. Overall, the extent of such development programmes operating in these localities was limited, and there were no substantive changes in programmes related to the outcomes assessed in this article, though there is a little evidence that RPS crowded out some programmes related to its primary objectives of education and healthcare (Maluccio and Flores, 2005) .
Econometric methodology for estimating programme effects a. Main specifications
Household level panel data were collected in both the intervention and control localities before and after RPS was implemented. This enables the use of the double-difference method to estimate the average programme effect. 5 The resulting measure can be interpreted as the expected effect of implementing the programme in a similar population elsewhere. In this analysis, the double-difference technique is extended to account for the four measurements taken in 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2004 . A basic estimating equation employing double-differences and incorporating household fixed effects is:
(1) transfers about ten months earlier, δ 4 is the estimated effect of having had no programme for three years and the full programme (though with slightly lower transfers as described in Section 2.2) for the previous year, compared to having had the full programme for three years and the supply-side components only for the fourth year. Given the randomisation of P ct , it (and any interactions involving it) is uncorrelated with all observed or unobserved household-or locality-level variables so that the δs can be estimated consistently and be given a causal interpretation. The above specifications do not condition on the household-level decision to participate in RPS but instead only on whether the programme was available in the household's locality. As a result, they estimate what is typically referred to as the (double-difference) 'intent-to-treat' average programme effect. Such estimates are not subject to selection biases associated with the decision to participate in the programme since they rely only on the randomised design. More than 10 per cent of the households in the intervention localities, however, were either excluded by RPS or chose not to participate in the programme. Survey sample households in this subgroup are not programme beneficiaries so that basing estimates on the sample that includes them potentially 'dilutes' the estimated effects of the programme.
To avoid this, I modify the above specifications by estimating instead the (double-difference) 'treatment-on-the-treated' average programme effect. P ct is replaced throughout with a dummy variable indicator of actual participation by that household, P ict . Since household-level programme participation was endogenous and may have been related to other characteristics that are also associated with the outcomes being considered, I endogenise the household participation decision with instrumental variables, using interactions of the locality-level random programme placement indicator (P ct ) with the year dummies as the instrumental variables for the household participation decision (P ict ) interacted with year dummies.
9 Since household participation rates are high, the instrumental variables approach yields estimates similar to, though in nearly all cases slightly larger than, the intent-to-treat estimates, with identical patterns of significance. In the analyses presented, all households interviewed in any of the pertinent survey rounds, that is, the unbalanced panel sample, are included.
b. Alternative specifications
To verify the robustness of the results presented, I consider a number of alternative specifications.
Double-difference estimates that do not control for household fixed effects (but rather for an array of demographic, education, and wealth characteristics of the household measured at baseline) also yielded similar coefficient estimates. When the standard errors associated with those results were estimated allowing for clustering at the locality level, however, the estimates were less precise (though all estimated programme effects presented as significant here remained significant).
Household random effects are an alternative estimation strategy. In some instances, however, (for example, total expenditures), a Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2003) rejected the equality of coefficients across the fixed-and random-effects models. For this reason, I prefer the fixed-effects estimates (for outcomes for which they are possible), even though according to the Hausman test random effects were acceptable for some outcomes.
The results that follow also ignore the stratified sample design which can be corrected for statistically by using locality-level sample weights; correcting for this aspect of the design (instead of controlling for household fixed effects) made no substantive changes to the results (Deaton, 1997) .
Previous evaluations of RPS indicate that for a number of indicators the programme was more effective for the extreme poor and poor, for example with larger estimated average programme effects on expenditures for these groups (Maluccio and Flores, 2005) . While this is also true for the estimated effects on expenditures presented in this article, it is not true for the other outcomes examined--results for productive investments and the MPC out of transfers do not differ by baseline poverty groups, in contrast to Gertler et al. (2006) and Todd et al. (2007) .
Finally, the estimating strategy employed, while not formally incorporating attrition, is likely to be robust to attrition bias, particularly if (observed or unobserved) persistent heterogeneity is leading to attrition. Such heterogeneity is directly controlled for in the household fixed-effects regressions.
Moreover, estimates based on a balanced panel data set, including only those 1259 households interviewed in all four years are similar, suggesting attrition related changes in sample composition are not driving the results. Therefore, I conclude that attrition is not a major concern for estimating programme effects in these data.
THE EFFECTS OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS ON CONSUMPTION AND INVESTMENT
Household expenditures
Despite strong growth in the late 1990s and in 2000 when gross domestic product grew nearly 13 per In the left-hand panel of Table 2 , I present the double-difference estimated average programme effects of the treatment-on-the-treated, instrumenting for household-level programme participation with availability of the programme in the locality, and controlling for household fixed effects (see Section 3.4);
hereafter I refer to these only as estimated programme effects.
The 2001 
Household consumer durables and economically productive assets
To this point, the evidence suggests that households were following closely the programme recommendations. It was empirically shown that expenditures increased substantially with the programme, as has been the case in other contexts (Hoddinott and Skoufias, 2005) , and possibly more than the amount of transfers given (at least in the first year). Such increases, however, are consistent with different underlying behaviours. For example, it is possible that investments were being made with the funds yielding (short-term) positive returns that enabled increased expenditures. Alternatively, it could be that households were spending nearly all of the transfers and investing or saving little. If the latter were the case, then one would expect to find the MPC out of transfers to be close to one.
In this subsection, I examine the evidence to determine whether and how transfers are being invested (savings are not observed) and certain productive activities within the household are changing. In Section 4.4 I estimate and examine the MPC. The questionnaire asked about various forms of investment, such as on consumer durable goods, agricultural or industrial machinery and equipment, livestock, and land use.
First, I explore ownership of consumer durables, many of which might make individuals more productive in the household (allowing more time for other productive activities or leisure) or be used in productive activities themselves. They include the following items: radio, sound system (tape recorder or stereo), television, video player, refrigerator, stove, iron, maize grinder, fan, toaster, mixer, microwave, air conditioner, sewing machine, typewriter, computer, bicycle, motorcycle, car, or boat. Ownership of most of these items before the programme was rare--2 per cent or less--with the exception of radios, sound systems, televisions, irons, maize grinders, and bicycles. Results examining the ownership of these items one at a time show little evidence that the programme led to increased ownership of these items, though ownership of televisions, irons, and maize grinders increased over time for all households [Appendix Table A2 ]. The story is similar when I consider ownership of at least one consumer durable, the total (sum of the) number of items reported, or the total value of the items owned (right-hand panel of Table 2 ). Ownership (and value) increased over time, but apparently not as a result of the programme. [
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The next asset considered is land. It is possible to examine on the extensive margin whether households were more likely to be cultivating land or to own any land, and, on the intensive margin, whether they owned more land (though these questions were asked in 2004 only). Given that these latter measures represent longer-term investments, it is plausible that a single-difference estimate in 2004 yields a valid estimated programme effect in original intervention localities and is not subject to the immediate shift in behaviour that was seen in the programme effect on household expenditures, for example. This exploration, however, yielded no evidence of programme effects on these outcomes (results not shown).
A potentially easier avenue for expanding agricultural production than acquiring or cultivating new lands is to expand livestock activities. There is no evidence, however, that the programme affected investment in animal husbandry, as shown in the right-side panel of Table 3 . In addition to the indicators considered in the table, estimates of the programme effect on 1) whether a household had a certain type of animal; 2) the number of animals of each type; and 3) the value of animals of each type yielded no systematic or significant pattern of investment.
Non-agricultural micro enterprises
The final dimension along which I consider changes in productive activities is household engagement in non-agricultural micro enterprise activities. Such self-employment activities are an important area to consider since Davis and Stampini (2002) and Davis and Murgai (2003) find that rural self-employment is associated with reductions in poverty at the household level in Nicaragua. For such activities, it is again possible to carry out double-difference estimation since information was collected in all survey years. In 2000, just over 10 per cent of the sample were working in some sort of economic activity related to producing and selling non-agricultural goods, reselling or retailing goods, or selling specialised services (such as repairmen), and during the evaluation period, the overall percentage declined slightly. For 2001 and 2002, the estimated programme effects on these activities were in some cases negative and statistically significant, though small. In 2004, there were no significant effects. While the evidence is mixed, if anything, rather than spurring micro enterprise activities, RPS appears to have provided a disincentive to micro enterprises. It is possible that this is because in the rural areas where the programme operated, characterized by relatively poor infrastructure, such activities only yield low marginal returns. It is also possible that the emphasis on child schooling reduced the available labour pool for such activities.
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The marginal propensity to consume out of transfers
The previous sections provided ample evidence that RPS led to increased expenditures, but only minimal evidence that there was increased economically productive investment. An alternative approach to exploring whether households spent their transfers predominantly on current consumption is to estimate the MPC out of transfers (hereafter, MPC). If the MPC is close to one, for example, it would suggest there was little saving (and therefore, little saving for future investment). Because income and saving are not observed, I follow Gertler et al. (2006) and specify a consumption equation in which expenditures are a function of actual transfers, past actual accumulated transfers, initial assets and demographics (to control for family labour), and productivity shocks (captured in the error term). Within this framework, initial assets and demographics are the key determinants of permanent income, obviating the need to control for income directly. 13 Thus β 1 represents the MPC and β 2 the increase in consumption from investment. It is possible for β 1 to be one and yet for β 2 to be positive, if expenditures made in earlier periods were yielding positive returns As with the household-level programme participation decision, the amount of actual (and thus cumulative) transfers received is endogenous. Therefore, in addition to (3) I also consider household fixed-effects instrumental variables estimates using potential and potential cumulative past transfers as instruments for actual and actual cumulative past transfers. 14 Potential transfers are calculated using the specific characteristics of each eligible household in the sample in each period. For example, a household with two school age children eligible for the programme would be eligible for the food security, school attendance, and two school supplies transfers (see Section 2.2).
Results, both with and without actual cumulative past transfers, are presented in Table 5 .
Controlling for the endogeneity of actual transfer amounts has only a small effect on the results, tending to reduce the estimated MPC coefficients by around 5 per cent, on average. The first two columns, where actual transfers are included but not cumulative transfers, yield a MPC greater than one, 1.1. This coefficient estimate raises the possibility that, despite the limited evidence on investment in previous sections, transfers had a multiplier effect on consumption expenditures, similar to (but smaller than) the income multiplier effects found in Mexico (Sadoulet et al., 2001) . For two reasons, however, such a multiplier effect seems unlikely. First, the estimated coefficients for MPC in the first two columns are not statistically different from 1.0. Second, when I break out the effect of transfers by year of participation in the programme (which is not the same for all households given the cross-over design), a different pattern emerges. In columns three and four, the 2 nd row represents the MPC estimated from transfers made during the first year that a household was a programme beneficiary. For Phase I households, this was 2001 and for Phase II households, 2004 . The MPC during this year was higher still, 1.2, and is statistically different from 1.0 (p=0.04 from a two-sided t-test using the estimates from the fourth column). In later years, however, the MPC drops by over 40 per cent to 0.7, well below one and also statistically different from it (p=0.04). 15 The MPC estimate in the first two columns (1.1) is not the simple average of the two MPC estimates in the third and fourth column because there are more observations in the sample that were firstyear programme beneficiaries. The simple average would imply an overall MPC of approximately 0.95, only slightly higher than that estimated by Gertler et al. (2006) . Since it was clear that the transfers were to last for three years (and thus were not permanent), this suggests households closely adhered to programme recommendations regarding the use of transfers.
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First-year beneficiary households spend even more than the actual value of transfers received. It is possible that initially households are taking advantage of their newfound wealth accorded them by beneficiary status, including transfers projected to last for three years, and spending accordingly. They may even be satisfying pent-up demand. This is supported by the observation that the MPC decreases substantially in later years. The results are also consistent, however, with delays in the distribution of transfers. For example, in the first year of Phase I, only five out of a scheduled six transfers were distributed before the 2001 household survey, due to delays outside the programme's control (the final transfer was made later). If households planned to spend the entire transfer amount for that year, we would see a spending rate of 6/5 or 1.2 for every Córdoba transferred, identical to the estimated coefficient. It is not possible to empirically separate these different possibilities with the available data.
In the final two columns, I present results including actual cumulative past transfers. If some of those transfers were invested in income generating activities that had generated short-term returns leading to increased expenditures, then β 2 would be positive and significant. This does not seem to have been the case; actual cumulative past transfers have no effect on current expenditures. While it is possible that any investments undertaken require a longer period than covered here to yield returns (up to 3 years in the case of the original intervention group), combined with the limited evidence on investments in the earlier sections, it seems more likely that there are no such effects.
CONCLUSIONS
Using a randomised community-based evaluation, in this article I have explored the extent to which a conditional cash transfer programme in Nicaragua led to economically productive investments other than human capital, the primary programme objective. This was done by assessing programme effects on both consumption and investment, during a period marked by economic decline and then recovery. The estimates presented are the overall average programme effects, that is, they combine supply-and demandside components of the programme. They represent the short-term effects of the programme (after one, two, or four years), although some of the outcomes examined are themselves long-run indicators, such as investment in productive goods and land.
A crucial question not addressed by previous research is the extent to which effects of RPS will Programme effects in years when transfers were being given are reflected clearly in increased expenditures, the lion's share of which was on food expenditures. Those increases largely disappeared, however, when the transfers ceased. With those findings on expenditures, I turned to an assessment of the programme on investment of various types. There was only limited evidence that the programme led to an increase in investment, for agricultural equipment. These results were corroborated by a separate analysis estimating a consumption equation, which demonstrated that cumulative past transfers had no effect on current expenditures.
The findings do not imply that the programme had no long term effects--it almost certainly did in terms of investment in child health and education which should continue to lead to benefits for many years to come. In contrast to Mexico, however, where there seems to be substantial investment and returns from it (Gertler et al., 2006; Todd et al., 2007) , there was only weak, albeit positive, evidence that RPS improved investment activities in the rural localities in which it operates, possibly due to 1) the economic downturn experienced in these areas during the period, 2) the strong programme orientation toward increased food expenditures, and 3) the limited opportunities in the impoverished rural areas where it operated.
1 Census comarcas are administrative areas within municipalities that typically include between one and five small communities averaging 100 households each.
2 The value of the supply-side services, as measured by how much RPS paid to the providers, was also substantial--approximately $50 for the education workshops and $110 for the healthcare services for children under age five, per beneficiary household.
3 LSMS surveys are typically implemented in two visits to the household (Grosh and Glewwe, 2000) . 4 These and other descriptions of poverty in the sample are calculated based on 2001 per capita annual expenditure poverty lines of $202 ($C 2691) for extreme poor (calculated as the amount required to purchase a minimum requirement food basket) and $386 (C$ 5157) for poor, which adds nonfood requirements (World Bank, 2003) .
Households are classified into poverty groups based on their per capita annual total household expenditures (including own-production) measured before the programme in 2000 and using these 2001 Nicaraguan poverty lines.
5 See Ravallion (2001 Ravallion ( , 2007 for useful discussions on this and related evaluation tools. 6 The household fixed effects implicitly control for locality-level fixed effects as well. (StataCorp, 2005) . *** indicates significance at the 1 per cent, ** at the 5 per cent, and * at the 10 per cent levels. 
